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In this paper we develop a structural model of female employment and fertility which 
accounts for intertemporal feedback effects between the two outcomes. We identify the effect 
of financial incentives on the employment and fertility decision by exploiting variation in the 
tax and transfer system which differs by employment state and number of children. To this 
end we simulate in detail the effects of the tax and transfer system including child care costs. 
The model provides estimates of structural preferences of women which can be used to 
study the effect of various policy reforms. In particular, we show that increasing child care 
subsidies conditional on employment increases labor supply of all women as well as fertility 
of the childless and highly educated women. 
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Over the last decades there has been a dramatic decline in the birthrate in most developed
countries. At the same time employment rates of women have been increasing. However, in
most countries female employment rates, in particular of mothers with young children, are
still fairly low. One prominent example of a country with low fertility rates and low mothers’
employment rates is Germany. In the year 2006, the total fertility rate in Germany was 1.33
and thus one of the lowest among OECD countries. While the overall female employment rate
in Germany (62%) is above the OECD average (57%), the employment rate of mothers with
young children is relatively low. Only 36% of all mothers with children below the age of three
years are employed and the employment rate for mothers with the youngest child aged three to
ﬁve years amounts to 55% (all numbers OECD (2007)).
Given these demographic challenges, policy makers in all countries have introduced ﬁscal
instruments intending to encourage female employment and fertility. Examples are the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the US, the Working Tax Credit (WTC) in the UK or the French
Family Tax Splitting. Moreover, most countries directly transfer money to families with children
through universal chid beneﬁts or through subsidized child care facilities and provide parental
leave schemes.
Previous empirical literature provides mixed evidence about the success of these policy instru-
ments in fostering female employment or fertility.1 Household based in-work credits such as the
EITC or the WTC induce positive and signiﬁcant participation eﬀects for single mothers, how-
ever they tend to reduce the labor supply of secondary earners (Blank, 2002; Blundell, 2000; Hotz
and Scholz, 2003). Since eligibility of these programmes is conditional on having children, both
the EITC and the WTC might positively aﬀect fertility. Brewer et al. (2008) provide evidence
for signiﬁcant fertility eﬀects of in-work credits for the UK, and for the US, Baughman and
Dickert-Conlin (2003) show that the EITC had an eﬀect on fertility. Amongst others, Lalive
and Zweimueller (2005) ﬁnd that the duration of parental leave has a positive and sizable eﬀect
on fertility and a negative impact on employment. While universal child beneﬁts which are
unconditional on the employment state tend to have positive eﬀects on fertility (e.g. Milligan
(2005)), the causal eﬀect of subsidized child care facilities on the number of children born is less
clear. For the US, Blau and Robins (1989) ﬁnd evidence that child care costs negatively aﬀect
the fertility decision. For Germany, it has been shown by Hank et al. (2004) that the availability
of full-time subsidized child care positively aﬀects fertility. Finally, in a recent study on Spain,
Azmat and Gonzalez (2009) show that the combined introduction of a tax credit for working
mothers and of child deductions for all household had a positive eﬀect on both female employ-
ment and fertility. However, the authors argue that the overall child deductions signiﬁcantly
reduced the positive employment eﬀects.
The aim of this paper is to provide further empirical evidence how child related transfers
aﬀect fertility and the female employment behavior. In particular we evaluate the employment
and fertility eﬀects of subsidized child care. Since only working women beneﬁt from subsidized
1For a detailed survey, see Gauthier (2007).
1child care, this particular reform might tackle the two demographic challenges, i.e. low fertil-
ity and low female employment rates at the same time. In contrast to most of the previous
literature which identiﬁes the eﬀects of ﬁnancial incentives directly from policy reforms using
standard evaluation techniques, e.g. Lalive and Zweimueller (2005), we develop an intertempo-
ral structural model which allows us to estimate the behavioral responses of child care reforms.
Therefore, our paper has two main contributions.
First, we propose an identiﬁcation strategy of an intertemporal structural model of female
employment and fertility. As in Laroque and Salanie (2008), identiﬁcation relies on variation
of ﬁnancial incentives by working hours, number of children and gross household income. In
contrast to Laroque and Salanie (2008) however, we allow for intertemporal feedback eﬀects be-
tween employment and fertility similar to e.g. Carrasco (2001). We model the employment and
fertility decision jointly to control for simultaneity of both processes and account for intertem-
poral non-separable preferences by estimating a dynamic panel data model with random eﬀects
and an appropriate treatment of the initial conditions problem. Finally, we follow Laroque and
Salanie (2008) by modelling in great detail the variation in ﬁnancial incentives, which in our case
not only result from the tax-transfer system but also from child care institutions. Estimation
is based on a sample of married and cohabiting women for the period 2000 - 2007 using panel
data from the German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP).
The second contribution of the paper is the evaluation of the employment and fertility eﬀects
induced by a child care reform. Such a reform induces ﬁnancial incentives only for women in
employment with newborn children and is therefore most promising to tackle the demographic
challenges of a society with low fertility rates and low female employment. Thus, the key question
we want to answer in this analysis is if there exists empirical evidence for this double positive
eﬀect of the child care reform. In order to get a better understanding of the size and importance
of the eﬀects we compare the behavioral eﬀects of this child care reform with the eﬀects induced
by universal child beneﬁts. Both reforms are designed such that before behavioral adjustment
they have the same ﬁscal costs.
The empirical results show that child care subsidies targeted at working mothers induce
sizable employment eﬀects yet overall there are no positive signiﬁcant fertility eﬀects. However,
we ﬁnd that for two subgroups, namely highly educated women, and women without other
children, subsidized child care would increase fertility in similar magnitude as a universal child
beneﬁt.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop the model and
discuss in detail the empirical strategy and identiﬁcation. Then we present the data, descriptive
evidence and the estimation results. Based on the estimation we evaluate the behavioral eﬀects
of the child care reform. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Overview of the model
There exists a large empirical literature on female employment behavior and the fertility decision.
Models range from reduced form static speciﬁcations which treat the employment and fertility
2decision separately to dynamic structural life cycle models where women maximize life cycle
utility and jointly determine their optimal behavior, e.g. Francesconi (2002). Keane and Wolpin
(2002) show that a ﬁrst order Markov model serves as a good approximation of the predicted
optimal fertility and employment behavior over the life-cycle. Therefore numerous recent studies
have adopted a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of a ﬁrst order Markov model to estimate the life-cycle
behavior with respect to employment and fertility. Recent examples include Carrasco (2001),
Del Boca and Sauer (2006) or Michaud and Tatsiramos (2008).2 Michaud and Tatsiramos (2008)
stress the importance to allow for the endogeneity of fertility when approximating life-cycle
employment of women, as the strict exogeneity assumption would rule out any intertemporal
feedback eﬀects between employment and fertility. To account for this endogeneity Carrasco
(2001) and Michaud and Tatsiramos (2008) analyze female employment and fertility jointly in
a dynamic bivariate-probit panel model and for identiﬁcation they use the sex composition of
siblings as an exclusion restriction.
In our analysis we closely follow the recent literature and approximate the life-cycle behavior
of women in a ﬁrst order Markov model. However in contrast to Carrasco (2001) and Michaud
and Tatsiramos (2008) we use a diﬀerent approach to account for the simultaneity between
fertility and employment. In particular, we follow the idea of Laroque and Salanie (2004)
and Laroque and Salanie (2008) and use an identiﬁcation strategy that relies on the fact that
employment and fertility behavior induces variation in the net incomes through the tax and
transfer system and through child care institutions among comparable households. The variation
can be exploited to estimate the sensitivity of fertility and employment with respect to ﬁnancial
incentives. In contrast to Laroque and Salanie (2008) we apply this methodology not to a
static model of female behavior but place it in the intertemporal setting discussed above. In
the following section we will in detail discuss how the German tax and transfer system induces
variation by fertility and employment status and we will provide evidence that this variation is
of important size. In addition to income taxation and direct transfers the government introduces
ﬁnancial incentives through subsidized child care. We will show that the subsidies strongly vary
by region which introduces further variation. Finally, we can exploit the time dimension of
the panel data. Over the observed time span several reforms of the tax and transfer system
and changes in the availability of subsidized child care have altered the ﬁnancial incentives for
households diﬀerently by region.
2.1 Empirical model
In this analysis, we focus only on married and non-married cohabiting couples, indexed i ∈ I. In
each period a household derives utility from net household income Yit, leisure time Lit and from
a newborn child Fit. Leisure time is deﬁned as non-working time. Hence, we don’t distinguish
between leisure time spent with and without children. Further, as common in this literature we
do not account for savings and thus we assume that net household income equals consumption.
We simplify the utility maximization of the household and do not consider collective bar-
2Hyslop (1999) derives a dynamic employment model which is consistent with life-cycle optimization
3gaining between the spouses. Instead, we assume that the wife optimally decides about her
employment and fertility behavior and maximizes the household utility conditional on her hus-
band’s behavior.3 We approximate the employment behavior with E discrete employment states
and assume that the women can choose between non-employment, marginal employment and
regular employment. Moreover, the household decides about fertility F which is a binary choice
variable. To model employment and fertility jointly we allow for all working and fertility com-
binations which in total results in a choice set of E × F = J combinations. The net household
income Yit, which is calculated using a microsimulation model, varies for all J combinations,
leisure time Lit varies by the E diﬀerent employment states and the indicator for a newborn by
fertility state Fit.
Timing of events
When analyzing the female employment behavior and the fertility decision jointly it is necessary
to deﬁne the timing of both events. It is very unlikely that the observed employment decision at
the birth date of the newborn or even in the ﬁrst month after birth reﬂects the optimal decision
of the mother in the ﬁrst period, i.e. in the ﬁrst year. In Germany, maternity protection laws
strictly forbid employment 6 weeks before and 8 weeks after giving birth. Thus, if only yearly
observations about the employment behavior is available it is problematic to assume that both
events take place in the same period t. 4
In this study we use monthly employment information and combine this with the birth date
of a child (i.e. month of birth) to construct an exact timing of events for each woman. Female
employment behavior depends heavily on the age of the newborn in the ﬁrst year. In our data we
basically observe no employed mothers with a newborn younger 6 months, and the employment
rates hardly increase until the newborn reaches the ﬁrst birthday. Thus, it seems that the
relevant decision of the mother to take up employment takes place only a year after she gave
birth. Therefore, in the following we assume that the employment decision at time t is observed
when the age of the newborn is 12 months. For consistency we drop households with newborns
younger than 12 months.
Empirical speciﬁcation
The model proceeds as follows. In each period t the wife maximizes the utility of the household
conditional on the behavior of her partner by jointly choosing her employment and fertility
state. We allow for heterogeneity between households and model the preferences depending
on observable and unobservable characteristics. We condition the behavior of the women on
standard demographic characteristics Xit such as age, education, marital status or nationality
as well as on the number of other children younger than 18 years living already in the household.
Moreover we model preferences as a function of the previous employment state Eit−1 and fertility
3At ﬁrst glance this often applied simpliﬁcation might seem restrictive. However, empirical evidence suggests
that cross elasticities between spouses are either not signiﬁcant or of little importance (Steiner and Wrohlich, 2004)
and this provides justiﬁcation for this assumption.
4In the SOEP only since 2001 information is available to distinguish between mandatory maternity leave and
voluntarily chosen parental leave.
4in the last period Fit−1. The conditioning on the lagged employment and fertility status makes
our model intertemporal in line with a ﬁrst order Markov process. Further, we account for
unobservable eﬀects which might inﬂuence the optimal choice of the women. We distinguish
between individual speciﬁc random eﬀects ai which are time constant and error terms ijt which
vary over time, individuals and choice combinations.
We follow the literature on discrete choice models (McFadden, 1974) and assume the error
terms ijt to follow an i.i.d. extreme value distribution. Given this assumption the probability






In general intertemporal models based on panel data suﬀer from the problem of initial condi-
tions. This problem arises as the employment status and the fertility of a women observed in the
initial observation t = 0 cannot be assumed to be random. In fact it is likely that non-random
unobservable eﬀects are correlated with the status in the initial state. To account for the initial
condition problem we follow Wooldridge (2005) and model the distribution of the individual
speciﬁc random eﬀects ai conditional on the initial observation. This method is operationalized
by allowing the mean of the individual speciﬁc unobserved eﬀect to depend on the ﬁrst obser-
vation of the female’s employment status and the number of children younger 18 years in the
initial period. The remaining stochastic element of the individual random eﬀect, denoted with
ci, will be nonparametrically speciﬁed as discussed below.5
We parameterize the above deﬁned utility function with a log speciﬁcation of the net house-
hold income, denoted by yjt, linear and quadratic terms for the female leisure time, and with a
discrete indicator for fertility. Moreover, we allow for multiple interaction of the three factors.
This speciﬁcation guarantees that utility is concave in income but it allows the shape of the util-
ity function to be completely ﬂexible with respect to the leisure and fertility term. Suppressing
the indicator for the household, the utility level at alternative j and time t has the following
form:
Ujt = βyyjt + βlyyjtLjt + βlLjt + βllL2
jt + βfFjt + βflFjtLjt + βfyFjtyjt. (2)
Preferences for income vary by the age of both partners, and the total number of children
living in the household Xyt. Preferences for leisure time are aﬀected by several demographic
characteristics denoted with Xlt including age, education, marital state, nationality and region.
Moreover the lagged employment and fertility state and the variables describing the initial state
are included in matrix Xlt. Similarly, preferences for fertility vary by observables Xft including
the behavior in the lagged period and in the initial observation.
5Akay (2009) performs several Mote Carlo simulation to study the performance of the Wooldridge method.
He ﬁnds that in moderately long panels with more than 5 periods the methods performs well relative to other
procedures to account for the non-random selection.
5βy = αy0 + αy1Xyt + cy (3)
βl = αl0 + αl1Xlt + cl (4)
βf = αf0 + αf1Xft + cf (5)
As mentioned above, vector ci captures the remaining stochastic element of the individual
speciﬁc random eﬀect ai. We specify ci nonparametrically as random coeﬃcients of βy βl βf
following Heckman and Singer (1984) with K points of support and allow the random coeﬃcients
to correlated. More precisely the random coeﬃcients are described by three points of support















3) which load on one
probability vector. This speciﬁcation is ﬂexible enough to freely estimate the correlation of the
unobservables between the three preference terms.
Mass points and the transformed probabilities π are jointly estimated with the parameters











Pr(J = j)ditj, (6)
where ditj = 1 if j is the chosen alternative and 0 otherwise.
2.2 Identiﬁcation
As mentioned above, for the identiﬁcation of the joint decision about employment and fertility we
follow Laroque and Salanie (2008) and exploit the variation in net income by number of children
and employment states through the tax-transfer system including child care institutions. The
required variation results mainly from joint taxation of spouses with full income splitting, the
design of out-of work transfers, child rearing beneﬁts which are means-tested, child beneﬁts
which are not means-tested, a tax allowance for children, and subsidized child care facilities.
In the following we will brieﬂy discuss the institutional features and provide empirical evidence
about the magnitude of the variation we use for our identiﬁcation strategy.
Joint income taxation
In Germany, married spouses can ﬁle taxes jointly and make use of full income splitting, which
leads to high marginal tax rates and low work incentives for secondary earners. This is partic-
ularly true for employment above “marginal employment” deﬁned as employment with a salary
of less than 400 Euro per month, since only income above this threshold is due to social security
contributions and income tax.
Child-rearing beneﬁt
A second part of the tax-transfer system that is essential for our application is the child-rearing
beneﬁt (“Erziehungsgeld”). This is a means-tested transfer for families with children in the ﬁrst
6Probabilities are transformed to guarantee positive probabilities that add up to unity.
6two years after birth. It is granted if at least one parent works less than 30 hours per week. In
addition, there is an income thresholds up to which the beneﬁt is granted (16,500 Euro per year
for a couple household); above this threshold, the beneﬁt is withdrawn at a rate of 63%.7 Thus,
the child-rearing beneﬁt depends on both, absolute income of the household if the mother does
not work and on her working hours.
Child beneﬁt and child tax allowance
Another important beneﬁt for families in Germany is the universal child beneﬁt (“Kindergeld”)
that is granted for each child until the age of 18 years.8 For the ﬁrst and second child, it
amounted to 130 Euro per month in 1999 and was raised to 138 Euro in 2000 and to 154 Euro
in 2002. For the third child it amounts to 154 Euro and for the fourth and every subsequent
child to 179 Euro, respectively, during the whole observation period. In addition to variation
across birth order of the child and the time period, additional variation comes from the fact that
this child beneﬁt is accounted against the child tax allowance (“Kinderfreibetrag”). The child
tax allowance can be deducted from taxable income and amounted to 3,534 Euro per year in
1999 and was raised to 5,080 in 2001 and to 5,808 in 2002. The child tax allowance leads to a
higher return than the child beneﬁt for tax ﬁlers with a pre-tax income of 60,000 Euro or more.
Only one of the two, beneﬁt or tax-allowances, is granted at the same time. The tax authorities
calculates which is more beneﬁcial for every tax ﬁler.
Out-of work transfers
In addition to these family- or child-related beneﬁts, there exist the general means-tested out-
of work beneﬁts (“Arbeitslosengeld II”) and housing beneﬁts that also depend on the number
of children.9 Moreover in 2005, the government introduced an in-work tax credit for families
(“Kinderzuschlag”) that is granted to parents who have earnings that cover their own means
but not those of their children. This beneﬁt amounts to a maximum of 140 Euro per month,
however, only within very small income brackets.
Empirical evidence of income variation by gross earnings
In Figure 1 we summarize how the mentioned features of the tax and transfer system aﬀect the
net household income by gross earnings, which strongly depend on female employment, and by
the presence of a newborn. In particular, the graph shows the diﬀerence in the available net
household income for a household with and without a newborn. Figure 1 only reﬂects the eﬀects
of the tax and transfer system without subsidies for child care costs which will be discussed
below.
7In 2007, the “Erziehungsgeld” has been replaced by a new parental leave beneﬁt (“Elterngeld”) that is not
means-tested but rather depends positively on pre-birth earnings and is granted for one year. Since this reform
was established after the end of our observation period, this is not relevant for our analysis. For more details on
the old and the new parental leave beneﬁt, see Spiess and Wrohlich (2008).
8If a child is in education, the beneﬁt can be drawn up to the age of 25.
9In addition to the means tested out-of work beneﬁts unemployed might be eligible for temporary unemploy-
ment beneﬁts. Since in this study we analyze the employment behavior on a yearly basis we abstract from the
temporary transfers.
7[Figure 1 : about here]
At very low gross earnings, the additional net income in case of a newborn child is very high,
amounting to about 600 Euro per month. This is due to the fact that (i) out-of work transfers
are higher for households with a child and that (ii) the child-rearing beneﬁt is granted in addition
to social assistance.10 At about 20,000 Euro of gross annual earnings, the gain in net income
is even higher due to the “Kinderzuschlag”, however this beneﬁt is withdrawn at a relatively
high rate. Above that threshold, also the child-rearing beneﬁt is withdrawn, and so the income
diﬀerence markedly drops to around 160 Euro per month. Above 40,000 Euro gross income per
year, there is only little variation due to the tax system. Around 41,000 Euro a non-linearity is
induced by the solidarity surcharge that is lower for families with children. Above 61,000 Euro,
the child tax allowance yields higher returns than the child beneﬁt, therefore the income gain
rises linearly from this point on.
Child care institutions
Variation in net income, or more speciﬁc, in disposable income, however does not only result
from the non-linearities in the tax-transfer system, but also from regional diﬀerences in child
care institutions. For children up to three years, availability of public child care is relatively
low, in particular in West Germany, although availability has been increasing in recent years.
In 2002, there were public child care slots available only for 3% of all children in this age group
in West Germany; in 2006, this number has increased to 8% (Wrohlich (2007)). East Germany
traditionally has a relatively high availability, with an average of 40 slots per 100 children in
this age group (in 2006). However, empirical studies (e.g. Wrohlich (2008)) have shown that in
both parts of the country, there is considerable excess demand for subsidized child care. Fees
for the subsidized slots are relatively low, amounting to 81 Euro for a part-time slot and 114
Euro for a full-time slot (on average). On the other hand, privately organized child care comes
at considerably higher cost, around 5-6 Euro per hour at least. Thus, for families who do not
have access to a subsidized child care slot, child care costs are relatively high. As suggested in
Wrohlich (2006) and Haan and Wrohlich (2009), we use a measure that takes rationing explicitly
into account. Since we do not know if a family we observe in the data is rationed with respect to
child care, we assume that parents face “expected” costs of child care that consist of fees for a
subsidized slot on the one hand and costs for private child care on the other hand. The two parts
are weighted by the local availability of child care centers for the age group of children up to
three years.11 The measure of child care costs that we use in our framework thus increases with
the amount of parents’ fees to subsidized slots (that mainly depend on region and household
income) and decreases with the availability of child care facilities (depends on region).
[Table 1 : about here]
While the fees for subsidized child care remained fairly constant over the observation period,
there has been an increase in availability of child care slots, at least in the period from 2002
10We assume that this household is only eligible for the means-tested minimum income when out of work.
11More details of the calculation of this measure of child care costs are provided in the Appendix.
8to 2006. Thus, “expected” costs of child care have been slightly declining. More important,
however, is the regional variation. We have information on availability rates of all 440 counties
in Germany. Generally, East Germany has higher availability rates than West German states.
In both parts of the country, availability is higher in urban than in rural areas. Table 1 shows
how child care costs vary across region and population density (all values refer to 2006).
Empirical evidence of income variation by female employment
Obviously, incentives created by the tax-transfer system and by child care institutions, not only
vary by gross household income, but mostly by the employment status of the mother. This is
best summarized in budget lines for stylized households (Figure 2) that shows net household
income as a function of working hours of the mother. In this stylized household, the father
is working full-time and earns the median of the male wage distribution (16 Euro per hour),
while the mother varies working hours from 0 to 40, earning the median of the female wage
distribution (12.4 Euro per hour). The black line shows net household income of this couple
in case they do not have any children. Except for the kink at around 8 hours per week, where
income taxation under the joint tax system sets in, the line runs fairly linear. This is also true
for the case in which this family has a newborn child as shown in the dark grey line above,
running almost parallel to the black one. This household is not eligible for out-of work transfers
or the child-rearing beneﬁt as these social transfers are withdrawn at lower income thresholds.
For this household, the only diﬀerence comes from the child beneﬁt of 154 Euro.
[Figure 2 : about here]
The picture changes, however, once we deduct child care costs in case that the mother is
working. The disposable income of the family with child care costs is shown in the light grey line.
Except for very low working hours of the mother, disposable household income is lower than for
the same family without a newborn child. This highlights the strong disincentives for mothers’
employment due to high child care costs. While in the case of non-employment, a newborn child
increases disposable household income, this is not the case if the mother is working more than a
few hours per week. Moreover, since we assume that child care costs increase with working hours
of the mother, she can hardly increase the total household income by working longer hours.
3 Data and descriptive evidence
3.1 Data and central variables
This study draws on data from the SOEP which is an annual representative sample of over 11,000
households living in Germany which contains information about socio-economic variables at the
individual and household levels.12 We construct an unbalanced panel of married and cohabiting
households with consecutive observations in at least two years between 2000 - 2007 inclusive
which yields retrospective information for the ﬁscal years 2000 - 2006. We exclude households
12For a detailed description of the data set, see Haisken De-New and Frick (2005).
9with primary earnings of the female spouse from self-employment as well as those households
where the woman is in full-time education. Further, we only consider households with a female
spouse older than 22 and younger than 45. The upper age limit is deﬁned by the maximum age
of fertility. Since we restrict our sample to married or cohabiting couples we observe only very
few households with women younger than 25 which full-ﬁll our selection criteria. Therefore, we
decided to restrict the sample at the bottom of the age distribution in order to guarantee robust
results. These exclusions yield a sample with 10845 person year observations corresponding to
2714 diﬀerent households.
Employment behavior
The SOEP includes detailed information about an individual’s monthly employment state in the
year prior to the interview date. This allows us to precisely identify the working behavior of a
mother at a deﬁned period after giving birth. As mentioned above we consider the employment
behavior 12 months after birth. The data allow us to distinguish three discrete employment
states, non-employment, marginal employment and regular employment. More precisely, we
deﬁne marginal employment as working less than 12 hours per week, and regular employment
working above this threshold. The observed group speciﬁc median working hours deﬁne the
employment in the two working categories, namely 5 hours and 30 hours per week. This classiﬁ-
cation allows us to distinguish employment which is exempted from social security contributions
from regular employment. The latter group however includes both part time and full time
working women.13 The three employment states allow us to study the working behavior both
on the intensive (working hours) and the extensive margin (participation). As discussed above
the ﬁscal treatment and the ﬁnancial incentives strongly diﬀer between marginal or part-time
employment and full-time employment. Therefore, this distinction is quite important.
Fertility
The observed birth date of a child deﬁnes fertility of the mother. In the sample period we
observe 884 newborn children which we can link to socio-economic variables of their parents and
the employment status of the mother.
Net household income
Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on the net household income which varies by employment and
fertility state. The net household income is computed with the microsimulation model STSM
(Steiner et al., 2008). Based on variables drawn from the SOEP, gross earnings, the taxable
income, the amount of income taxes and all important transfers can be derived at the household
level. This information together with the imputed household speciﬁc child care costs is suﬃcient
to describe the work incentives for each woman for all J employment and fertility states. Gross
household income consists of the observed earnings of the husbands, the alternative speciﬁc
13Before 2004, it is not possible to distinguish between part-time and marginal employment in the calendar
data. Since in the years from 2004 on, we observe more mothers in marginal than in part-time employment, we
assume that before that year, all mothers who are working less than full-time are in marginal employment.
10gross earnings of the wife and further non labor income, such as rental and capital income.14
The income tax is computed by applying the income tax function to the taxable income of the
household. Income tax and employee’s social security contributions are deducted from gross
income, and social transfers that depend on the employment state are added to derive net
household income. Social transfers include child beneﬁts, child-rearing beneﬁts, unemployment
compensation, housing beneﬁts and social assistance. Finally, we subtract the household speciﬁc
child care costs for households in which both spouses work.
Gross hourly wages
The employment state speciﬁc gross labor earnings of the wife are calculated on basis of the
alternative speciﬁc working hours and a constant hourly gross wage. Therefore, it is necessary
to derive the gross wage distribution for the working and non-working populations. This is the
distribution of the oﬀered marked wages which measures the signaled productivity of the women.
For the working women in period t, we deﬁne their observed wage as their individual draw from
the oﬀered wage distribution.
For women belonging to the non-working population in period t the draw from the oﬀered
wage distribution can not be observed. Therefore, it is necessary to estimate their expected
gross hourly wages that is, the person speciﬁc distribution of oﬀered wages Wit. As Wit is not
observable, we estimate ˆ Wit, a measure of the mean of the distribution of oﬀered wages. More
precisely, we estimate a Mincer wage equation with selection eﬀects using the information of the
working population and interpret the predicted hourly wages of the non-working individuals as
the mean of the distribution of oﬀered wages. The wage estimation is performed separately for
East and West Germany. The speciﬁcation and the estimation results are presented in more
detail in the Appendix II.
Socio-demographic variables
In the empirical analysis we condition the joint employment and fertility decision in addition to
the net household income on the standard socio-demographic variables. In particular, we allow
fertility and the female employment behavior to depend on the age of both spouses, years of her
formal education, the total number of children younger 18 years in the household, number of
children younger than school age, region and nationality.
3.2 Descriptive evidence
In Figure 3 we show the average employment and fertility rate of women by age and by region.
Female employment behavior in the states of the former socialist regions, i.e. East Germany,
is still quite diﬀerent from the behavior of women living in the western part. Although labor
demand restrictions are higher in the East, employment rates of East German women are in
general markedly higher. However, despite the diﬀerent level of employment in both regions we
ﬁnd a similar shape of the employment rates by age which are increasing in the West from about
14For the sample of married households, labor income is by far the largest component of the gross household
income. Non-labor income is assumed to be exogenous.
11about 50% at the age of 25 to close 78% at the last observed age. In the East the rates increase
from about 60% to more than 85% over the same age.
[Figure: 3: about here]
Fertility rates in our sample are fairly similar between West and East Germany. Over all
ages, we observe on average 8.3% of west German women with a newborn child and 7.5% in the
East. Broken down by age we ﬁnd the same pattern for both regions. Fertility rates are highest
for women in their mid twenties and are declining with age. Hence, this trend is contrary to the
increase in the employment rate by age.
In Tables 2 and 3 we show the employment behavior unconditional and conditional on fertility
and by demographic characteristics.
[Table 2 : about here]
As expected, employment and fertility rates vary by demographic characteristics. In addition
to the above discussed diﬀerences between East and West Germany, there are striking diﬀerence
by education and family composition. Overall employment rates increase with education, and
fertility rates are slightly higher for women with high education. The latter fact is certainly
inﬂuenced by our sample selection. Since we condition our sample on married women older
than 22 years, we do not observe the very young women who give birth and these tend to be
women with lower education. Hence, caution is required when analyzing the empirical results by
education in particular when focussing at the low education. Not surprisingly women without
any other children have higher employment rates and a higher probability of having a newborn.
[Table 3 : about here]
Conditional on having a newborn, we observe as well strong diﬀerences in the employment
behavior between the subgroups (Table 3). Interestingly, the group diﬀerences are fairly constant
independent of the fertility status. The overall non-employment rate for women without a
newborn is close to 25% whereas for mothers with a newborn it amounts to over 75%. In
contrast, the share of marginal employment increases with a newborn. This could be due to
persistence in the employment behavior of women or driven by women changing from full-time
work to marginal employment after giving birth. Further, we ﬁnd interesting diﬀerences by the
demographic subpopulations. As shown in Figure 3 employment rates in the East are higher
than in the West. This ﬁnding changes with the fertility status. With a newborn, East German
mothers are still more likely to have a regular job, however marginal employment is more common
in the West. The data show a clear pattern by education. The highly educated, i.e. women with
more than 13 years of formal schooling have the highest participation rates independent of their
fertility status. On the contrary we ﬁnd a strikingly low share of low educated women with less
than 11 years of schooling in employment. In our sample only slightly more than 1% of the low
educated with a newborn have a regular employment. Finally, we ﬁnd an important diﬀerence
in the employment behavior between women with and without other children. Women without
12other children who do not experience a birth have employment rates close to 90%. Further,
there is a diﬀerence in the employment behavior by the rank of the newborn. If the newborn
is the ﬁrst child employment rates of the mother are clearly higher than for women who have
already at least one child.
4 Estimation results
In Table 4 we present the estimation results of the above speciﬁed joint model of fertility and
female employment. In addition to the speciﬁcation which accounts nonparametrically for un-
observed individual eﬀects, the Table includes as well a speciﬁcation without unobserved het-
erogeneity. In general the coeﬃcients of the two speciﬁcations are of similar magnitude, however
according to the Akaike Criterion, which is based on the diﬀerence between the log likelihoods,
the speciﬁcations are diﬀerent. The signiﬁcance of the discrete mass points and their related
probabilities underline the importance of accounting for unobserved eﬀects.
[Table 4 : about here]
In general a separate interpretation of the size of the estimated coeﬃcients is not meaningful.
First, in non-linear discrete models marginal eﬀects, or elasticities should be considered, second
multiple interactions further complicate the interpretation of a single eﬀect, and ﬁnally, as
discussed in detail by Wooldridge (2005), when modelling the distribution of the random eﬀects
a clear interpretation of the time constant variables is not possible. Therefore, in the following
section, we will derive group speciﬁc changes in the employment and fertility behavior induced
by ﬁnancial incentives which provide a better understanding how the female behavior varies by
observable characteristics. However, some ﬁndings are worth mentioning.
Most important work incentives matter. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the net household
income on the employment and fertility choice. The majority of women has a positive prefer-
ence for leisure time however this strongly varies by observed and unobserved characteristics. As
discussed above a clear structural interpretation of fertility is very diﬃcult, since in our speciﬁca-
tion preferences for children can not be separated from additional monetary and non-monetary
costs. In line with previous studies, e.g. Hyslop (1999) we ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence for state
dependence in employment. Ceteris paribus the lagged leisure time signiﬁcantly increases the
preferences for leisure in the current period. As expected this eﬀect is reduced once controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity. On the contrary we ﬁnd the expected negative eﬀect of a birth in
the last year on fertility in the current year. As mentioned above we ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of
unobserved heterogeneity. The correlation coeﬃcients imply that there is positive correlation in
the unobservables aﬀecting the preferences for income and leisure while unobservables aﬀecting
the fertility decision are negatively correlated with those aﬀecting leisure and income.
Fit of the model
Before discussing in detail the eﬀect of ﬁnancial incentives on fertility and female employment
behavior, it is necessary to asses the quality of the empirical speciﬁcation. In Figure 4 we present
13the simulated employment and fertility rates by age in comparison to the observed rates in the
data. The simulation is based on the estimated coeﬃcients of the observed and the unobserved
characteristics.15 The simulation shows that our model speciﬁcation ﬁts the observed age speciﬁc
pattern very closely both in terms employment and fertility.
[Figure 4 : about here]
In Appendix III we present further speciﬁcation checks, not only diﬀerentiated by age but
also by region and education. In general the model replicates the data very precisely, although
for sub populations with only few observations the model has problems to predict the exact age
pattern.
The eﬀect of employment related ﬁnancial incentives on employment and fer-
tility
In order to study how employment related ﬁnancial incentives aﬀect the female labor supply
and fertility behavior, we simulate behavioral changes based on the estimated model for several
subgroups. More precisely we analyze the labor supply and fertility responses of a 1% increase
in the net income at work (Table 5). The eﬀects should be interpreted as the short run or one
period eﬀects as we condition the behavioral changes on the observed behavior in the lagged
period. To study the signiﬁcance of the behavioral eﬀects we derive a distribution of average
eﬀects based on a parametric bootstrap and present here the median and in italic the 5% and
95% conﬁdence interval.
[Table 5 : about here]
In general, we ﬁnd that the female employment behavior reacts to ﬁnancial incentives. Over-
all, as a result of the income increase for working women the total employment rate increases
by about 0.7% and the average weekly working hours increase by 0.46%. The lower increase
in working hours implies that the additional ﬁnancial incentives make marginal employment
relatively more attractive than regular employment. Our results show the expected pattern of
heterogeneity in the employment behavior which is in line with the above discussed diﬀerence
in the employment behavior. While groups with a relatively strong labor market attachment,
i.e. women in East Germany, highly educated women and women without children, only slightly
change their employment behavior, the response of the other groups, in particular the low ed-
ucated women, is markedly higher. According to our estimation fertility hardly reacts to the
higher ﬁnancial incentives for working women. On average we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant reduction by
of about 0.5% in the fertility rate. This negative eﬀect implies that the substitution eﬀect
dominates the income eﬀect in the sense that the opportunity costs for children increase.
The eﬀect of child related ﬁnancial incentives on employment and fertility
Before evaluating the employment and fertility eﬀects of a speciﬁc child care reform, we brieﬂy
discuss how women would react to an increase in overall child beneﬁts. We calibrate this
15We use calibration methods (Empirical Bayes) to calculate for each household posterior probabilities of the
discrete mass points, for details see e.g. Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004).
14hypothetical reform such that the ﬁscal costs before behavioral adjustment match those of the
child care reform discussed in the next section. More precisely, child beneﬁts for all children
younger than three years are increased by 360 Euro per year which amounts to a 20% increase
of the current child beneﬁts. The purpose of the following analysis is twofold. First we want to
show how women in general react to child related ﬁnancial incentives such that we can compare
our results to the previous literature. Second, we will use the ﬁndings as a comparison to the
behavioral results of the child care reform.
[Table 6 : about here]
As expected we ﬁnd a small but signiﬁcant negative employment eﬀect of the increase in
overall child beneﬁts. This transfer is unconditional of work and reduces work incentives relative
to non-work given a positive income eﬀect. On the contrary we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant
fertility eﬀect of this reform of about 4.6%. By subgroups the eﬀects are quite similar, yet there
exist some diﬀerences which can be either related to diﬀerent ﬁnancial incentives induced by
higher child beneﬁts or to heterogeneity in behavior. Financial incentives are highest for women
with low wages, i.e. the low educated and women in East Germany, and in line with that we
ﬁnd above average fertility eﬀects for those groups. As discussed above women without children
have a higher probability to give birth, therefore they react strongest to the additional ﬁnancial
incentives.
The magnitude of these fertility eﬀects is similar to what other studies have found. Milligan
(2005) ﬁnds for Canada an increase in the probability of having a child of 17% if child beneﬁts
increase by 1,000 Canadian Dollars per year. In a study on US data, Whittington, Alm, and
Peters (1990) ﬁnd an average increase of 11% in the birthrate resulting from the 1989 reform
of the personal exemption for dependents in the income tax. This reform increased the tax
value of the personal exemption by almost 100 Dollar per year. In contrast to our reform, which
increases transfers only for three years, the personal exemption for dependents is granted as
long as a child is ﬁled as dependent, usually for a minimum of 18 years. A study evaluating a
recent reform of parental leave beneﬁts in Austria by Lalive and Zweimueller (2005) shows that
an additional year of parental leave beneﬁts (worth about 4,080 Euro per year, granted for 2.5
years) increases the probability that mothers who already have one child get another child by
15% within the ﬁrst three years after the ﬁrst birth.
5 How can the policy aﬀect fertility and employment behavior?
In the following, we use the empirical framework developed in this paper to study how policy
reforms might at the same time stimulate female employment behavior and fertility. In particular
we focus on an increase in subsidized public child care facilities for children younger than three
years. In line with a recently introduced reform in Germany which will be fully implemented
by the year 2013, we simulate a policy scenario without rationing for subsidized child care.
More precisely, this reform provides subsidized day care for all children under three years if
15both parents are working.16 Given the high costs of private child care, this reform increases
disposable household income by several hundred Euro, in particular if the mother is working full
time.
[Table 7 : about here]
The results show that this child care reform leads to positive employment eﬀects: Participa-
tion increases by 1.6% and working hours by 2.4%. As far as fertility is concerned, we do not ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant eﬀect, at least not for the population average. However, if we look in more detail
on results for subgroups, we ﬁnd some interesting diﬀerences: While the employment eﬀects are
very similar across East and West Germany, across education groups as well as by child parity,
there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences with respect to the fertility eﬀect. For two groups we ﬁnd large
positive fertility eﬀects, namely for highly educated women (7%) and for women who are at risk
to getting their ﬁrst child (9%).
The diﬀerences between the subgroups are in line with the ﬁnancial incentives induced by this
reform: The income gain under this child care reform depends on (i) working hours, (ii) number
of children under the age of three years, (iii) rationing of subsidized child care before the reform
and (iv) the opportunity costs for work. Mothers who already have one or more children below
the age of three years have strong incentives to start employment. Therefore, their probability
for an additional child decreases. In contrast, women who are currently childless only proﬁt
from the reform in case they get a child, which is why we ﬁnd such a large fertility eﬀect for this
group. Highly educated women have the highest opportunity costs of work. Therefore the joint
employment and fertility with subsidized child care is most attractive for this group.
When we compare the results from this child care reform to an increase in unconditional
child beneﬁts such as shown in the section above,17 we ﬁnd that neither policy reform can tackle
the challenges in demographic changes by fostering employment and fertility at the same time,
at least not for the whole population. Overall, higher lump-sum beneﬁts lead to an increase in
the fertility rate, however at the cost of lower employment levels. Increasing subsidies for child
care conditional on employment signiﬁcantly increases participation and working hours, yet on
average does not aﬀect fertility.
However, our results suggest that the child care reform would have a double positive eﬀect
for two important subgroups. First, the probability of entering motherhood for the ﬁrst time
increases without negative employment eﬀects. This is in contrast to an increase in child beneﬁts
as employment rates would be reduced for women giving birth to the ﬁrst child. Second we ﬁnd
that both employment and fertility of highly educated women would positively react to higher
16Since we are only modelling mothers’ labor supply, we assume that in case that the mother is working, the
family is eligible for subsidized child care.
17The two reforms are designed to have the same ﬁscal costs before behavioral adjustment. We calculate that
before behavioral adjustment the child care reform will cost about 750 million Euro per year, since there are about
130,000 children under the age of three who have working mothers but are not enrolled in subsidized child care.
This group will become eligible for subsidized child care after the reform. Assuming average costs of 7,000 Euro
per child per year, and subtracting average parents’ fees of 1,200 Euro per child per year, we get overall costs of
about 750 million Euro per year. With this amount, unconditional cash beneﬁts could be increased by 360 Euro
per year for all children under three years, which we simulated in the section above.
16subsidies for child care. Again, child beneﬁts would lead to a reduction in employment for this
subgroup.
Finally, when comparing the two diﬀerent reforms it is necessary to mention that although
both reforms have the same ﬁscal costs before behavioral changes, the adjustment of employment
and fertility decisions will lead the child care reform to be less expensive since more women work
and the overall child beneﬁt to be more expensive since women drop out of the labor force and
reduce working hours.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed an intertemporal model of the joint decision of female employ-
ment and fertility. For the identiﬁcation we exploit variation in the tax and transfer system
which diﬀers by employment and number of children. Additional variation comes from diﬀer-
ences in child care costs that vary by working hours, household income and region. We allow for
intertemporal feedback eﬀects between employment and fertility by estimating a dynamic panel
data model with random eﬀects based on data from the German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP).
Estimation results show that ﬁnancial incentives do matter with respect to both decisions: We
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of net household income on employment and fertility. Moreover,
we ﬁnd state dependence in employment and - as expected - a negative eﬀect of a birth in the
last year on fertility in the current year. On top of that, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of unobserved
heterogeneity.
The second contribution of our paper is that we use the model to evaluate employment and
fertility eﬀects of policy reforms targeted to cope with the challenges of the demographic change.
In particular, we are interested in analyzing whether a reform of child care subsidies for working
mothers can meet two challenges at the same time, namely increasing employment and fertility.
The hypothetical reform we evaluate is similar to a reform which will be implemented until the
year 2013 in Germany. In particular it is the aim to provide all working women subsidized child
care for their children younger three years. Our results show that this reform has signiﬁcantly
positive employment eﬀects. On average, participation rates increase by 1.6% and working hours
increase by 2.4%. However, on average we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀect on fertility. Only for two
important subgroups, namely highly educated women and women who give birth for the ﬁrst
time an increase in subsidized child care would lead to positive employment and fertility eﬀects.
Comparing the results of this particular child care reform to an increase in unconditional child
beneﬁts, we ﬁnd that in the latter case there is a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on fertility for all
groups of women, yet at the cost of negative employment eﬀects.
We thus conclude that for a country like Germany that has to deal with low fertility rates as
well as low employment rates of mothers, it is very diﬃcult to design family policy reforms that
will tackle both demographic problems at the same time. However, providing conditional child
care subsidies for working mothers seems to be more promising since i) for two subgroups we
ﬁnd a double positive eﬀects and ii) the positive employment eﬀect would signiﬁcantly reduce
the ﬁscal costs of this reform.
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20Appendix I: Calculation of child care costs
Following Wrohlich (2006) we argue that given the considerable excess demand for subsidized
child care facilities in Germany, we have to calculate a measure of child care costs that takes
rationing explicitly into account. In Germany, parents’ fees to subsidized child care facilities are
relatively low, however, access to these slots is rationed in many regions in Germany, in particular
for children below the age of three years. Families who do not have access to subsidized child
care have to rely on the private market of nannies or babysitters, which comes at considerably
higher costs. Since we do not know in the data whether a family is restricted in the access to
subsidized child care or not, we use a measure of “expected costs of child care” that consist of
a weighted average of parents’ fees to subsidized child care and costs of private child care. As
weights we use the number of subsidized child care slots in a county (Kreis) per 100 children
within each age group (0-3 years and 3-6 years). The costs of private child care cns, i.e. costs
for a nanny or other forms of privately organized day care is set at 5 Euro per hour for the years
1999 to 2002 and 6 Euro for the years 2003 to 2006. The parents fees for subsidized child care
are predicted for each child on the basis of estimations of parents’ fees reported in the SOEP in
the waves 2002, 2005 and 2007. Fees for part-time and full-time care are estimated separately
using Tobit models. This method is chosen since about 10% of all parents do not have to pay
at all for center-based child care. Estimation results are presented below.
[Table 8 : about here]
Appendix II: Wage estimation
[Table 9 : about here]
Appendix III: Model ﬁt by region and education
[Figures 5 and 6 : about here]
21Table 1: Variation in childcare costs across states (2006)
Population Density East Germany West Germany
(number of inhabitants) Part-time costs Full-time costs Part-time costs Full-time costs
< 20.000 90 307 100 447
20.000 - < 100.000 88 267 100 433
100.000 - < 500.000 92 299 101 446
> 500.000 103 362 105 406
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP and data on child care availability from the
German statistical oﬃce.
Table 2: Employment and birth rate
Employment Rate Fertility Rate
East Germany 78.46 7.49
West Germany 69.28 8.34
Low Education 54.73 7.91
Medium Education 73.63 7.94
High Education 80.23 9.67
Other Children 67.6 6.4
No Other Children 82.65 13.52
All 71.3 8.15
Low education: less than 11 years of formal schooling,
medium education: between 11 and 13 years of formal
schooling, high education: more than 13 years of formal
schooling. Employment state of mothers of the newborn
is observed 12 months after giving birth.
Source: SOEP, wave 2000-2007.
Table 3: Distribution of employment states
Non Emp. Marginal Emp. Regular Emp. Non Emp. Marginal Emp. Regular Emp.
Without Newborn With Newborn
East Germany 16.92 2.73 80.35 78.65 11.24 10.1
West Germany 26.77 13.37 59.86 74.08 22.66 3.26
Low Education 42 14.62 43.38 83.33 15.28 1.39
Medium Education 22.11 11.13 66.76 75.78 19.11 5.11
High Education 15.21 5.55 79.24 62.41 31.58 6.02
Other Children 29.24 13.74 57.03 78.63 18.51 2.86
No other Children 9.16 2 88.84 69.72 23.06 7.22
All 24.6 11.02 64.38 75 20.36 4.64
Low education: less than 11 years of formal schooling, medium education: between 11 and 13 years of formal
schooling, high education: more than 13 years of formal schooling. Marginal employment includes part-time work.
Employment state of mothers of the newborn is observed 12 months after giving birth.
Source: SOEP, wave 2000-2007.
22Table 4: Estimation results
Model without random eﬀects Model with random eﬀects
Coef. Std. error t-stats Coef. Std. error t-stats
Income 10.140 1.412 7.181 9.536 1.714 5.563
Leisure -9.927 0.472 -21.022 -7.079 0.548 -12.928
Fertility -15.856 0.521 -30.423 -19.167 0.793 -24.176
Income* Number of Children -0.373 0.175 -2.129 -0.660 0.209 -3.156
Income* Wife younger 30 years 0.972 0.687 1.415 0.240 0.835 0.288
Income* Wife aged between 30 - 34 years 0.996 0.492 2.027 0.800 0.623 1.284
Income* Wife aged between 35 - 39 years 1.818 0.460 3.953 1.857 0.597 3.114
Income* Husband’s age -13.825 3.034 -4.557 -9.428 3.587 -2.629
Income*Leisure -0.165 0.032 -5.099 -0.188 0.045 -4.177
Leisure
2 0.569 0.034 16.643 0.372 0.039 9.538
Leisure* Wife younger 30 years -6.040 1.097 -5.505 -7.071 1.149 -6.155
Leisure* Wife aged between 30 - 34 years -0.215 0.660 -0.326 -0.276 0.730 -0.378
Leisure* Wife aged between 35 - 39 years 0.056 0.659 0.086 0.304 0.728 0.417
Leisure
2* Wife younger 30 years 0.455 0.085 5.373 0.525 0.089 5.918
Leisure
2* Wife aged between 30 - 34 years 0.016 0.051 0.320 0.015 0.057 0.267
Leisure
2* Wife aged between 35 - 39 years 0.001 0.051 0.020 -0.022 0.057 -0.377
Leisure* Husband’s age -1.458 0.347 -4.204 -1.346 0.403 -3.338
Leisure* Birth in last period -0.245 0.031 -7.964 -0.021 0.041 -0.496
Leisure* Number of Children 0.033 0.017 1.879 0.069 0.023 2.970
Leisure* German -0.038 0.033 -1.162 -0.044 0.046 -0.946
Leisure* East Germany -0.209 0.029 -7.340 -0.244 0.039 -6.327
Leisure* Low education 0.078 0.044 1.788 0.208 0.059 3.502
Leisure* Medium education -0.043 0.036 -1.201 -0.044 0.048 -0.923
Leisure* Married -0.055 0.040 -1.370 -0.070 0.055 -1.281
Leisure* Lagged leisure 3.954 0.088 45.089 3.079 0.113 27.220
Leisure* Initial leisure 1.159 0.088 13.154 1.647 0.124 13.304
Leisure* Fertility 1.041 0.067 15.439 1.420 0.093 15.314
Fertility* Income 3.063 0.134 22.807 3.493 0.178 19.637
Fertility* Number of Children -1.211 0.103 -11.722 -1.151 0.120 -9.599
Fertility* Birth in last period -0.896 0.135 -6.621 -1.448 0.155 -9.325
Fertility* Wife younger 30 years 2.656 0.217 12.218 2.387 0.261 9.132
Fertility* Wife aged between 30 - 34 years 2.337 0.166 14.055 2.132 0.200 10.642
Fertility* Wife aged between 35 - 39 years 1.375 0.162 8.485 1.025 0.189 5.412
Fertility* German 0.208 0.132 1.573 0.123 0.153 0.804
Fertility* East Germany 0.465 0.139 3.349 0.263 0.162 1.623
Fertility* Low education -0.546 0.167 -3.266 -0.820 0.193 -4.240
Fertility* Medium education -0.228 0.124 -1.841 -0.052 0.146 -0.352
Fertility* Married 0.544 0.173 3.145 0.213 0.199 1.070
Fertility* Lagged leisure 5.341 0.569 9.384 6.598 0.656 10.055
Fertility* Initial leisure -2.916 0.404 -7.211 -3.656 0.464 -7.874
Fertility* Initial fertility -0.006 0.094 -0.068 -0.130 0.105 -1.237
Income* Mass Point 1 1.421 1.956 0.727
Income* Mass Point 2 3.656 0.982 3.722
Leisure* Mass Point 1 9.851 3.356 2.935
Leisure* Mass Point 2 -0.943 0.073 -12.864
Fertility* Mass Point 1 -2.206 0.352 -6.265
Fertility* Mass Point 2 2.068 0.291 7.115
π1 -1.212 0.135 -9.007
π2 -2.577 0.121 -21.346
Correlation (Income, Leisure) 0.735 0.245
Correlation (Income, Fertility) -0.433 0.302
Correlation (Fertility, Leisure) -0.915 0.030
Log likelihood 7544.620 7330.990
Number of observations: 10845. Low education: less than 11 years of formal schooling, medium education:
between 11 and 13 years of formal schooling, high education: more than 13 years of formal schooling. In
parenthesis we present the group speciﬁc employment and birth rates. π1 and π2 are transformed probabilities.
Standard errors of the correlations are derived using parametric bootstrap with 1000 replications.
Source: SOEP, wave 2000-2007, STSM.
23Table 5: Average behavioral eﬀects of an increase in income at work in %
Change in Employment Change in Working Hours Change in Fertility
5th Perc. Median 95th Perc. 5th Perc. Median 95th Perc. 5th Perc. Median 95th Perc.
East Germany 0.41 0.44 0.47 0.27 0.29 0.31 -0.70 -0.57 -0.41
West Germany 0.73 0.81 0.87 0.47 0.52 0.56 -0.56 -0.46 -0.32
Low Education 1.05 1.16 1.26 0.67 0.73 0.79 -0.64 -0.55 -0.45
Medium Education 0.61 0.68 0.72 0.40 0.44 0.47 -0.60 -0.50 -0.37
High Education 0.46 0.52 0.55 0.28 0.32 0.35 -0.44 -0.31 -0.13
Other children 0.75 0.83 0.90 0.51 0.57 0.60 -0.78 -0.65 -0.49
No children 0.40 0.43 0.47 0.21 0.23 0.26 -0.35 -0.23 -0.11
All 0.65 0.72 0.77 0.42 0.46 0.49 -0.58 -0.48 -0.35
Low education: less than 11 years of formal schooling, medium education: between 11 and 13 years of formal schooling,
high education: more than 13 years of formal schooling. Conﬁdence intervals are derived using parametric bootstrap
with 100 replications.
Source: SOEP, wave 2000-2007, STSM.
Table 6: Average behavioral eﬀects of an increase in child care beneﬁts in %
Change in Employment Change in Working Hours Change in Fertility
5th Perc. Median 95th Perc. 5th Perc. Median 95th Perc. 5th Perc. Median 95th Perc.
East Germany -0.14 -0.12 -0.10 -0.22 -0.19 -0.17 4.63 5.04 5.42
West Germany -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.23 -0.21 -0.19 4.24 4.50 4.79
Low Education -0.17 -0.15 -0.13 -0.27 -0.24 -0.21 4.95 5.27 5.59
Medium Education -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.22 -0.20 -0.18 4.25 4.55 4.80
High Education -0.12 -0.11 -0.09 -0.24 -0.21 -0.19 3.89 4.22 4.53
Other children -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 -0.21 -0.19 -0.18 4.99 5.29 5.60
No children -0.14 -0.12 -0.11 -0.27 -0.24 -0.21 3.29 3.63 3.90
All -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.23 -0.21 -0.19 4.32 4.62 4.88
Low education: less than 11 years of formal schooling, medium education: between 11 and 13 years of formal schooling,
high education: more than 13 years of formal schooling. Conﬁdence intervals are derived using parametric bootstrap
with 100 replications.
Source: SOEP, wave 2000-2007, STSM.
24Table 7: Average behavioral eﬀects of an increase in child care subsidies in %
Change in Employment Change in Working Hours Change in Fertility
5th Perc. Median 95th Perc. 5th Perc. Median 95th Perc. 5th Perc. Median 95th Perc.
East Germany 1.31 1.40 1.48 1.79 1.93 2.06 -5.08 -2.28 1.25
West Germany 1.58 1.69 1.78 2.40 2.58 2.73 -1.46 0.34 2.87
Low Education 1.84 1.98 2.15 2.70 2.96 3.23 -4.32 -3.18 -2.07
Medium Education 1.51 1.62 1.71 2.24 2.41 2.54 -2.84 -0.95 1.89
High Education 1.17 1.26 1.34 1.78 1.91 2.06 4.00 6.73 10.59
Other children 1.63 1.74 1.84 2.49 2.67 2.82 -7.65 -6.31 -4.74
No children 1.20 1.29 1.42 1.66 1.79 1.98 5.89 8.80 13.04
All 1.51 1.62 1.71 2.24 2.41 2.55 -1.87 -0.18 2.46
Low education: less than 11 years of formal schooling, medium education: between 11 and 13 years of formal schooling,
high education: more than 13 years of formal schooling. In parenthesis we present the group speciﬁc employment and
birth rates. Conﬁdence intervals are derived using parametric bootstrap with 100 replications.
Source: SOEP, wave 2000-2007, STSM.
Table 8: Estimation of parents’ fees for center-based childcare
Part-time care Full-time care
Coeﬀ. St. Err. Coeﬀ. St. Err.
Dummy variable indicating that child is aged 0-3 17.86 6.22 33.35 10.09
Number of children in household -11.68 2.14 -21.18 5.23
Number of siblings in childcare -17.18 3.31 -19.59 8.10
Gross monthly income of parents/1000 0.58 0.05 0.68 0.14
Schlewig-Holstein 22.06 8.63 115.97 35.89
Hamburg 59.62 17.05 16.310 28.27
Niedersachsen 27.16 5.09 18.84 20.52
Bremen 20.52 15.2 115.83 49.70
Hessen 19.31 5.87 11.59 16.67
Rheinland-Pfalz -13.75 5.87 -54.12 16.06
Baden-Wuerttemberg -4.87 4.62 -50.59 13.98
Bayern 1.32 4.52 -3.46 14.25
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 40.17 18.39 1.86 19.66
Brandenburg -3.35 12.77 -47.12 15.56
Sachsen-Anhalt 15.17 10.10 -3.36 15.88
Thueringen 31.29 13.09 -44.24 13.02
Sachsen 2.65 8.19 -39.20 12.25
Berlin -1.88 12.84 -21.52 16.97
Year 2005 5.20 3.39 14.06 8.50
Year 2007 8.44 3.57 -0.70 8.57
Intercept 59.97 5.95 133.13 15.08
σ 47.14 1.08 68.84 2.47
Log-Likelihood -5440.2862 -2310.5862
Number of observations 1128 438
Thereof: Left-censored 123 36
Source: Estimations based on SOEP, wave 2002, 2005 and 2007.
25Table 9: Wage estimation
East Germany West Germany
Coeﬀ. St. Err. Coeﬀ. St. Err.
Wage Equation
Years of Education 0.059 0.003 0.066 0.003
Years of Full Time Work 0.016 0.004 0.032 0.005
Years of Full Time Work
2 -0.033 0.013 -0.098 0.025
Years of Part Time Work 0.006 0.004 0.015 0.006
Years of Part Time Work
2 -0.006 0.028 -0.053 0.044
Tenure 0.024 0.003 0.023 0.006
Tenure
2 -0.051 0.012 -0.049 0.026
Loss of human capital -0.056 0.009 -0.039 0.009
Years of Education x German 0.005 0.002
Years of Full Time Work x German -0.001 0.005
Years of Full Time Work
2 x German 0.011 0.026
Years of Part Time Work x German -0.016 0.007
Years of Part Time Work
2 x German 0.061 0.047
Tenure x German 0.000 0.006
Tenure
2 x German 0.000 0.027
Loss of human capital x German 0.016 0.010
Selection Equation
Medium Education 0.684 0.137 0.253 0.045
Higher Education 1.347 0.122 0.519 0.038
Vocational Degree 1.230 0.118 0.565 0.033
University Degree 2.031 0.127 1.116 0.041
Years of Full Time Work 0.114 0.009 0.140 0.005
Years of Full Time Work
2 -0.120 0.044 -0.280 0.026
Years of Part Time Work 0.137 0.015 0.156 0.007
Years of Part Time Work
2 -0.080 0.125 -0.371 0.053
German 0.008 0.031
Health 1 -0.019 0.006 -0.006 0.003
Health 2 0.007 0.007 -0.009 0.004
Married 0.312 0.043 -0.134 0.024
Child younger 3 -0.945 0.056 -1.231 0.031
Child between 3 and 6 -0.015 0.056 -0.396 0.027
Child between 6 and 17 -0.363 0.041 -0.476 0.023
Total Number od Children -0.343 0.044 -0.064 0.025
Other Household Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000




Notes: Wages are gross hourly wages measured in logs. Loss of human capital
is a weighted measure of years of unemployment capturing depreciation of
human capital. Estimation is based on pooled data for the period 2000-
2007. Time and region speciﬁc (Bundesland) dummies as well as dummies
for industry sector and ﬁrms size and a constant term have been included in
the estimation.
Source: SOEP, wave 2000-2007.






















































































Source: Own calculations based on STSM.
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net household income with newborn child
net household income with newborn child, less childcare costs
Source: Own calculations based on STSM.Figure 3: Observed employment and fertility by age
3A - Employment rates: West and East Germany 3B - Fertility rates: West and East Germany
Source: SOEP 2000 - 2007.
Figure 4: Model ﬁt by age
4A - Employment rates 4B - Fertility rates
Source: SOEP 2000 - 2007.
28Figure 5: Model ﬁt by age and region
5A - Employment rates: West 5B - Fertility rates: West
5C - Employment rates: East 5D - Fertility rates: East
Source: SOEP 2000 - 2007.
29Figure 6: Model ﬁt by age and education
6A - Employment rates: low education 6B - Fertility rates: low education
6C - Employment rates: medium education 6D - Fertility rates: medium education
6E - Employment rates: high education 6F - Fertility rates: high education
Source: SOEP 2000 - 2007.
30